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Abstract. A simple game (N, v) is given by a set N of n players and
a partition of 2N into a set L of losing coalitions L with value v(L) = 0
that is closed under taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W
with v(W ) = 1. Simple games with α = minp≥0maxW∈W,L∈L p(L)p(W ) < 1
are exactly the weighted voting games. Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014)
conjectured that α ≤ 1
4
n for every simple game (N, v). We confirm this
conjecture for two complementary cases, namely when all minimal win-
ning coalitions have size 3 and when no minimal winning coalition has
size 3. As a general bound we prove that α ≤ 2
7
n for every simple game
(N, v). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured that
α = O(
√
n). We prove this conjecture up to a lnn factor. We also
prove that for graphic simple games, that is, simple games in which
every minimal winning coalition has size 2, computing α is NP-hard,
but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. More-
over, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if α < a is
polynomial-time solvable for every fixed a > 0.
1 Introduction
Cooperative Game Theory provides a mathematical framework for capturing
situations where subsets of agents may form a coalition in order to obtain some
collective profit or share some collective cost. Formally, a cooperative game (with
transferable utilities) consists of a pair (N, v), where N is a set of n agents
called players and v : 2N → R+ is a value function that satisfies v(∅) = 0.
In our context, the value v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ N represents the profit for
S if all players in S choose to collaborate with (only) each other. The central
problem in cooperative game theory is to allocate the total profit v(N) of the
grand coalition N to the individual players i ∈ N in a “fair” way. To this end
various solution concepts such as the core, Shapley value or nucleolus have been
designed; see [24] for an overview. For example, core solutions try to allocate
the total profit such that every coalition S ⊆ N gets at least v(S). This is of
course not always possible, e.g., the core might be empty. This leads to related
questions like: “How much do we need to spend in total if we want to give at
least v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N?” In the specific case of simple games (cf.
below) where v takes only values 0 and 1, classifying coalitions into "losing" and
"winning" coalitions resp., one may also ask: “How much do we have to give in
the worst case to a losing coalition if we want to give at least v(S) = 1 to each
winning coalition?”
As mentioned above, we study simple games. Simple games form a clas-
sical class of games, which are well studied; see also the book of Taylor and
Zwicker [29]. The notion of being simple means that every coalition either has
some equal amount of power or no power at all. Formally, a cooperative game
(N, v) is simple if v is a monotone 0–1 function with v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1, so
v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . In other words, if
v is simple, then there is a set W ⊆ 2N of winning coalitions W that have value
v(W ) = 1 and a set L ⊆ 2Nof losing coalitions L that have value v(L) = 0. Note
that N ∈ W, ∅ ∈ L andW∪L = 2N . The monotonicity of v implies that subsets
of losing coalitions are losing and supersets of winning coalitions are winning.
A winning coalition W is minimal if every proper subset of W is losing, and a
losing coalition L is maximal if every proper superset of L is winning.
A simple game is a weighted voting game if there exists a payoff vector p ∈ Rn+
such that a coalition S is winning if p(S) ≥ 1 and losing if p(S) < 1. Weighted
voting games are also known as weighted majority games and form one of the
most popular classes of simple games.
However, it is easy to construct simple games that are not weighted voting
games. We give an example below, but in fact there are many important sim-
ple games that are not weighted voting games, and the relationship between
weighted voting games and simple games is not yet fully understood. Therefore,
Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [16] introduced a parameter α, called the
critical threshold value, to measure the “distance” of a simple game to the class
of weighted voting games:
α = α(N, v) = min
p≥0
max
W,L
p(L)
p(W )
, (1)
where the maximum is taken over all winning coalitions in W and all losing
coalitions in L. A simple game (N, v) is a weighted voting game if and only if
α < 1. This follows from observing that each optimal solution p of (1) can be
scaled to satisfy p(W ) ≥ 1 for all winning coalitions W .
A concrete example of a simple game (N, v) that is not a weighted voting
game and that has in fact a large value of α was given in [12]:
Example. Let N = {1, . . . , n} for some even integer n ≥ 4, and let the minimal
winning coalitions be the pairs {1, 2}, {2, 3}, . . . {n − 1, n}, {n, 1}. Consider any
payoff p ≥ 0 satisfying p(W ) ≥ 1 for every winning coalitionW . Then pi+pi+1 ≥
1 for i = 1, . . . , n (where n + 1 = 1). This means that p(N) ≥ 12n. Then, for at
least one of L = {2, 4, 6, . . . , n} and L = {1, 3, 5, . . . , n− 1}, we have p(L) ≥ 14n,
showing that α ≥ 14n. On the other hand, it is easily seen that p ≡ 12 satisfies
p(W ) ≥ 1 for all winning coalitions and p(L) ≤ 14n for all losing coalitions,
showing that α ≤ 14n. Thus α = 14n.
This example led the authors of [12] to the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 [12]. For every simple game (N, v), it holds that α ≤ 14n.
Our Results. In Section 2 we prove that Conjecture 1 holds for the case where
all minimal winning coalitions have size 3 and for its complementary case where
no minimal winning collection has size 3. We were not able to prove Conjecture 1
for all simple games. However, in Section 3 we show that α ≤ 27n ≈ 0.2858n.
In Section 4 we consider a subclass of simple games based on a natural
desirability order [25]. A simple game (N, v) is complete if the players can be
ordered by a complete, transitive ordering , say, 1  2  · · ·  n, indicating
that higher ranked players have more "power" than lower ranked players. More
precisely, i  j means that v(S∪i) ≥ v(S∪j) for any coalition S ⊆ N\{i, j}. The
class of complete simple games properly contains all weighted voting games [14].
For complete simple games, we show an asymptotically lower bound on α, namely
α = O(
√
n lnn). This bound matches, up to a lnn factor, the lower bound of
Ω(
√
n) in [12] (conjectured to be tight in [12]). Intuitively, complete simple games
are much closer to weighted voting games than arbitrary simple games. So, from
this perspective, our result seems to support the hypothesis that α is indeed a
sensible measure for the distance to weighted voting games.
In Section 5 we discuss some algorithmic and complexity issues. We focus
on instances where all minimal winning coalitions have size 2. We say that such
simple games are graphic, as they can conveniently be described by a graph
G = (N,E) with vertex set N and edge set E = {ij | {i, j} is winning}. For
graphic simple games we show that computing α is NP-hard in general, but
polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph G = (N,E) is bipartite, or if
α is known to be small (less than a fixed number a).
Related Work. Due to their practical applications in voting systems, com-
puter operating systems and model resource allocation (see e.g. [3,7]), structural
and computational complexity aspects for solution concepts for weighted voting
games have been thoroughly investigated [9,10,13,16].
Another way to measure the distance of a simple game to the class of weighted
voting games is to use the dimension of a simple game [28], which is the small-
est number of weighted voting games whose intersection equals a given simple
game. However, computing the dimension of a simple game is NP-hard [8], and
the largest dimension of a simple game with n players is 2n−o(n) [21]. Moreover,
α may be arbitrarily large for simple games with dimension larger than 1. Hence
there is no direct relation between the two distance measures. Gvozdeva, Hemas-
paandra, and Slinko [16] introduced two other distance parameters as well. One
measures the power balance between small and large coalitions. The other one
allows multiple thresholds instead of threshold 1 only.
For graphic simple games, it is natural to take the number of players n as the
input size for answering complexity questions, but in general simple games may
have different representations. For instance, one can list all minimal winning
coalitions or all maximal losing coalitions. Under these two representations the
problem of deciding if α < 1, that is, if a given simple game is a weighted voting
game, is also polynomial-time solvable. This follows from results of [17,23], as
shown in [13]. The latter paper also showed that the same result holds if the
representation is given by listing all winning coalitions or all losing coalitions.
As mentioned, a crucial case in our study is when the simple game is graphic,
that is, defined on some graph G = (N,E). In the corresponding matching game
a coalition S ⊆ N has value v(S) equal to the maximum size of a matching in
the subgraph of G induced by S. One of the most prominent solution concepts
is the core of a game, defined by core(N, v) := {p ∈ Rn | p(N) = v(N), p(S) ≥
v(S) ∀S ⊆ N}. Matching games are not simple games. Yet their core constraints
are readily seen to simplify to p ≥ 0 and pi+pj ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E. Classical solu-
tion concepts, such as the core and core-related ones like least core, nucleolus or
nucleon are well studied for matching games, see, for example, [4,5,11,19,20,27].
However, for graphic simple games we aim to bound p(L) over all losing coali-
tions, subject to p ≥ 0, pi + pj ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E, whereas for matching games
with an empty core we wish to bound p(N), subject to p ≥ 0, pi + pj ≥ 1 for all
ij ∈ E. Nevertheless, basic tools from matching theory like the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition play a role in both cases.
2 Two Complementary Cases
We will treat the following two “complementary” cases: when all winning coali-
tions have size equal to 3, and when no winning coalition has size equal to 3.
First observe that winning coalitions of size 1 do not cause any problems. If {i}
is a winning coalition of size 1, we satisfy it by setting pi = 1. Since no losing
coalition L contains i, we may remove i from the game and solve (1) with re-
spect to the resulting subgame. A similar argument applies if some i ∈ N is not
contained in any minimal winning coalition. We then simply define pi = 0 and
remove i from the game. Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that
all minimal winning coalitions have size at least 2 and that they cover all of N .
We first investigate the case where all minimal winning coalitions have size
exactly 2. This case (which is a crucial case in our study) can conveniently be
translated to a graph-theoretic problem. Let G = (N,E) be the graph with ver-
tex set N whose edges are exactly the minimal winning coalitions of size 2 in our
game (N, v). Our assumption that N is completely covered by minimal winning
coalitions means that G has no isolated vertices. Losing coalitions correspond to
independent sets of vertices L ⊆ N . Then the min max problem (1) becomes
α := αG := min
p
max
L
p(L), (2)
where the minimum is taken over all feasible pay-off vectors p, that is, p ∈ Rn+
with pi+pj ≥ 1 for every ij ∈ E, and the maximum is taken over all independent
sets L ⊆ N .
We first consider the case where G = (A ∪B,E) is bipartite. To explain the
basic idea, we introduce the following concept (illustrated in Figure 1).
Definition. Let G = (A ∪ B,E) be a bipartite graph of order n = |A| + |B|
without isolated notes and assume without loss of generality that |A| ≤ |B|. Let
λ ≤ 12 such that |A| = λn (and |B| = (1 − λ)n). We say that G is well-spread
A S
B N(S)
Fig. 1. A well-spread bipartite graph.
with parameter λ if for all S ⊆ A we have
|S|
|N(S)| ≤
|A|
|B| =
λ
1− λ.
(Here, as usual, N(S) ⊆ B denotes the set of neighbors of S in B.)
Examples of well-spread bipartite graphs are biregular graphs or biregular graphs
minus an edge. Note that if G is well-spread with parameter λ ≤ 12 , then Hall’s
condition |N(S)| ≥ |S| for all S ⊆ A is satisfied, implying that A can be com-
pletely matched to B (see, for example, [22]). The following lemma is the key
observation.
Lemma 1. Let G = (A ∪ B,E) be well-spread with parameter λ ≤ 12 . Then
p ≡ λ on B and p ≡ 1− λ on A yields αG ≤ 14n.
Proof. Assume L ⊆ N is an independent set. Let ρ ≤ 1 such that |L∩A| = ρλn.
Since G is well-spread, we get |N(L ∩ A)| ≥ ρ(1 − λ)n, so that |L ∩ B| ≤ (1 −
ρ)(1−λ)n. Thus p(L) = |L∩A|(1−λ)+|L∩B|λ ≤ ρλn(1−λ)+(1−ρ)(1−λ)nλ ≤
ρ 14n+ (1− ρ) 14n ≤ 14n. uunionsq
In general, when G = (A ∪ B,E) is not well-spread, we seek to decompose
G into well-spread induced subgraphs Gi = (Ai ∪ Bi, Ei) with A =
⋃
Ai and
B =
⋃
Bi. Of course, this can only work if G = (A ∪ B,E) is such that A can
be matched to B in G.
Proposition 1. Let G = (A∪B,E) be a bipartite graph without isolated vertices
and assume that A can be matched into B. Then G decomposes into well-spread
induced subgraphs Gi = (Ai ∪ Bi, Ei), with A =
⋃
Ai and B =
⋃
Bi in such a
way that for all i, j with i < j, λi ≥ λj and no edges join Ai to Bj.
Proof. Let S ⊆ A maximize |S|/|N(S). Set A1 := S and B1 := N(S). Let G′
be the subgraph of G induced by A\A1 and B′ := B\B1. Then G′ satisfies the
assumption of the Proposition. Indeed, if A′ cannot be matched into B′ in G′,
then there must be some S′ ⊆ A′ with |S′| > |N ′(S′)|, where N ′(S′) = N(S′)\B1
is the neighborhood of S′ in G′. But then |S ∪S′| = |S|+ |S′| and |N(S ∪S′)| ≤
|N(S)| + |N ′(S)| shows that S cannot maximize |S|/|N(S)|, a contradiction.
Thus, by induction, we may assume that G′ decomposes in the desired way into
well-spread subgraphs G2, . . . , Gk with parameters λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λk. The claim
then follows by observing that (i) no edges join B1 to A′; and (ii) λ1 ≥ λ2
(otherwise S ∪A2 would contradict the choice of S maximizing |S|/|N(S)|). uunionsq
We combine the last two results.
Corollary 1. For every bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) of order n satisfying
the assumption of Proposition 1, there exists a payoff vector p ≥ 0 such that
pi + pj ≥ 1 for ij ∈ E and p(L) ≤ 14n for any independent set L ⊆ A ∪ B. In
addition, p can be chosen so as to satisfy p ≥ 12 on A.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Note
that if p is chosen as p ≡ 1− λi on Ai, then it holds that p ≥ 12 indeed. uunionsq
As we will see, the assumption of Proposition 1 is not really restrictive for
our purposes. A (connected) component C of a graph G is even (odd) if C has
an even (odd) number of vertices. A graph G = (N,E) is factor-critical if for
every vertex v ∈ V (G), the graph G − v has a perfect matching. We recall the
well-known Gallai–Edmonds Theorem (see [22]) for characterizing the structure
of maximum matchings in G; see also Figure 2. There exists a (unique) subset
A ⊆ N , called a Tutte set, such that (i) every even component of G − A has a
perfect matching; (ii) every odd component of G− A is factor-critical; and (iii)
every maximum matching in G is the union of a perfect matching in each even
component, a nearly perfect matching in each odd component and a matching
that matches A (completely) to the odd components.
A
even
odd
Fig. 2. Tutte set A splitting G into even and odd components (possibly single nodes).
We are now ready to derive our first main result.4
Theorem 1. Let G = (N,E) be a graph of order n. Then αG ≤ 14n.
Proof. Let A ⊆ N be a Tutte set. Contract each odd component in G − A to
a single vertex and let B denote the resulting set of vertices. The subgraph G¯
induced by A ∪B then satisfies the assumption of Corollary 1. Let p¯ ∈ R|A|+|B|
be the corresponding payoff vector. We define p ∈ Rn by setting pi = p¯i for every
vertex i ∈ A and every vertex i that corresponds to an odd component of size 1
in G−A. All other vertices get pj = 12 .
It is straightforward to check that p ≥ 0 and pi + pj ≥ 1. Indeed, it holds
that p¯ ≥ 12 everywhere except on B, so the only critical edges ij have i ∈ A
4 For n is odd, the upper bound in Theorem 1 can be slightly strengthened to n
2−1
4n
[18].
and j a singleton odd component. But in this case pi + pj = p¯i + p¯j ≥ 1. Thus
we are left to prove that for every independent set L ⊆ N , p(L) ≤ 14n. Let B0
denote the set of singleton odd components i ∈ B, L0 := (L∩A)∪ (L∩B0) and
n0 := |A|+ |B|. Clearly, L0 is an independent set in the bipartite graph G¯ , and
p ≡ p¯ on L0. We thus conclude that p(L0) ≤ 14n0.
Next let us analyze L ∩ C where C ⊆ N\A is an even component. As C is
perfectly matchable, L contains at most |C|/2 vertices of C. So p(L∩C) ≤ 14 |C|.
A similar argument applies to the odd components. Let C be an odd component
in G−A of size at least 3. Then certainly L cannot contain all vertices of C, so
there exists some i ∈ C\L. Since C is factor-critical, C\i is perfectly matchable,
implying that L can contain at most half of C\i. Thus |L∩C| ≤ (|C|−1)/2 and
p(L ∩ C) ≤ (|C| − 1)/4.
Summarizing, n− n0 = |N | − (|A|+ |B|) is the sum over all |C|, where C is
an even component plus the sum over all |C| − 1 where C is an odd component,
and p(L\L0) is at most a 14 fraction of this, finishing the proof. uunionsq
We note that both decompositions that we use to define the payoff p can
be computed efficiently. For the Edmonds–Gallai decomposition, this is a well-
known fact (see, for example, [22]). For the decomposition into well-spread sub-
graphs, this follows from the observation that deciding whether maxS
|S|
|N(S)| ≤ r
is equivalent to minS r|N(S)| − |S| ≥ 0, which amounts to minimizing the sub-
modular function f(S) = r|N(S)| − |S|; see, for example, [26] for a strongly
polynomial-time algorithm.
We now deal with the more general case where there are, in addition, minimal
winning coalitions of size 4 or larger. First recall how the payoff p that we
proposed in Corollary 1 works. For a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) that is
split into well-spread subgraphs Gi = (Ai ∪ Bi, Ei) with parameter λi, we let
p ≡ λi on Bi. So for λi < 14 , p may be infeasible, that is, we may encounter
winning coalitions W of size 4 or larger with p(W ) < 1. This problem can
easily be remedied by raising p a bit on each Bi and decreasing it accordingly
on Ai. Indeed, the standard (λ, 1 − λ) allocation rule proposed in Lemma 1 is
based on the simple fact that λ(1 − λ) ≤ 14 , which gives us some flexibility for
modification in the case where λ is small. More precisely, defining the payoff to be
p :≡ 14(1−λ) > 14 on B and 1−p < 34 on A for a bipartite graph (G = (A∪B,E),
well-spread with parameter λ, would work as well and thus solve the problem.
Indeed, the unique independent set L that maximizes p(L) is L = B in this case,
which gives p(L) = p(B) = |B|/(4(1− λ)) = 14n.
There is one thing that needs to be taken care of. Namely, in Proposition 1
we assumed that G = (A∪B,E) has no isolated vertices, an assumption that can
be made without loss of generality if we only have 2-element winning coalitions.
Now we may have isolated vertices that are part of winning coalitions of size 4
or larger. But this does not cause any problems either. We simply assign p := 14
to these isolated vertices to ensure that indeed all winning coalitions W have
p(W ) ≥ 1. Formally, this can also be seen as an extension of our decomposition:
if G = (A ∪ B,E) contains isolated vertices, then they are all contained in B
(once we assume that A can be completely matched into B). So the set of isolated
vertices can be seen as a “degenerate” well-spread final subgraph (Ak ∪Bk, Ek)
with Ak = ∅ and parameter λk = 0. Our proposed payoff p ≡ 14(1−λk) would
then indeed assign p = 14 to all isolated vertices.
It remains to observe that when we pass to general graphs, no further prob-
lems arise. Indeed, all that happens is that vertices in even and odd components
get payoffs p = 12 which certainly does no harm to the feasibility of p. Thus we
have proved the following result.
Corollary 2. Let (N, v) be a simple game with no minimal winning coalition of
size 3. Then α(N, v) ≤ 14n.
We end this section with the complementary case where all minimal winning
coalitions have size 3.
Proposition 2. Let (N, v) be a simple game with all minimal winning coalitions
of size 3. Then α(N, v) ≤ 14n.
Proof. We try p :≡ 13 , which is certainly feasible. If this yields max p(L) ≤ 14n,
then we are done. Otherwise, there exists a losing coalition L ⊆ N with p(L) =
1
3 |L| > 14n, or equivalently, |L| > 34n. In this case we use an alternative payoff
p˜ given by p˜ ≡ 1 on N\L and p˜ ≡ 0 on L. Since |N \ L| < 14n, this ensures
p˜(L˜) < 14n for any losing coalition L˜. On the other hand, p˜ is feasible, since a
winning coalition W cannot be completely contained in L, that is, there exists
a player i ∈W with p˜i = 1 and hence p˜(W ) ≥ 1. uunionsq
We note that Proposition 2 is a pure existence result. To compute p˜ it requires
to solve a maximum independent set problem in 3-uniform hypergraphs, which
is NP-hard. This can be seen from a reduction from the maximum independent
set problem in graphs, which is well known to be NP-hard (see [15]). Given a
graph G = (V,E), construct a 3-uniform hypergraph G¯ as follows. Add n = |V |
new vertices labeled 1, . . . , n and extend each edge e = ij ∈ E to n edges
{i, j, 1}, . . . , {i, j, n} in G¯. It is readily seen that a maximum independent set
of vertices in G¯ (that is, a set of vertices that does not contain any hyperedge)
consists of the n new vertices plus a maximum independent set in G.
3 Minimal Winning Coalitions of Arbitrary Size
In this section we try to combine the ideas for the two complementary cases to
derive an upper bound α ≤ 27 for the general case. The payoffs p that we consider
will all satisfy p ≥ 14 so that only winning coalitions of size 2 and 3 are of interest.
The basic idea is to start with a bipartite graph (A∪B,E) representing the size 2
winning coalitions and a payoff satisfying all these. Standard payoffs that we use
satisfy p ≥ 14 on B and p ≥ 12 on A. Hence we have to worry only about 3-
element winning coalitions contained in B. We seek to satisfy these by raising
the payoff of some vertices in B without spending too much in total.
More precisely, consider a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) representing the
winning coalitions of size 2. As before, we assume that A can be completely
matched into B, so that our decomposition into well-spread subgraphs Gi =
(Ai∪Bi, Ei) applies (with possibly the last subgraph Gk = (Ak∪Bk, Ek) having
Ak = ∅ and Bk consisting of isolated points, as explained at the end of the
previous section). Recall the payoff λ¯i :≡ 14(1−λi) on Bi and 1− λ¯i on Ai defined
for the proof of Corollary 2. We first consider the following payoff p¯ :≡ 1 − λ¯i
on Ai and p¯ :≡ λ¯i on Bi for λi ≥ 14 , so λ¯i ≥ 13 . For subgraphs with λi < 14
(including possibly a final λk = 0) we define p¯ ≡ 23 on Ai and p¯ ≡ 13 on Bi. Thus
it holds that p¯ ≥ 13 everywhere, in particular, p¯ is feasible with respect to all
winning coalitions of size at least 3.
Let L¯ be a losing coalition with maximum p¯(L). We define an alternative
payoff p˜ as follows: For λi ≥ 14 we set p˜ :≡ 1− λ¯i on Ai, p˜ :≡ λ¯i on B ∩ L¯ and
p˜ :≡ 12 on Bi\L¯. For λi < 14 we set p˜ :≡ 34 on Ai, p˜ :≡ 14 on Bi∩ L¯ and p˜ :≡ 12 on
Bi\L¯. Clearly, both p¯ and p˜ are feasible. We claim that a suitable combination
of these two yields the desired upper bound (proof omitted) yielding Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. For p := 37 p¯+
4
7 p˜ we get α = maxL p(L) ≤ 27n.
Theorem 2. For every simple game (N, v), α(N, v) ≤ 27n.
4 Complete Simple Games
Intuitively, the class of complete simple games is “closer” to weighted voting
games than general simple games. The next result quantifies this expectation.
Theorem 3. A complete simple game (N, v) has α ≤ √n lnn.
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players and assume without loss of
generality that 1  2  · · ·  n. Let k ∈ N be the largest number such that
{k, . . . , n} is winning. For i = 1, . . . , k, let si denote the smallest size of a winning
coalition in {i, . . . , n}. Define pi := 1/si for i = 1, . . . , k and pi := pk for i =
k + 1, . . . , n. Thus, obviously, p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pk = · · · = pn.
Consider a winning coalition W ⊆ N and let i be the first player in W (with
respect to ). If |W | ≤ √n, then si ≤ |W | ≤
√
n and hence p(W ) ≥ pi = 1si ≥
1√
n
. On the other hand, if |W | > √n, then p(W ) > √npk ≥
√
n 1n =
1√
n
.
For a losing coalition L ⊆ N , we conclude that |L ∩ {1, . . . , i}| ≤ si − 1
(otherwise L would dominate the winning coalition of size si in {i, . . . , n}). So
p(L) is bounded by max
∑k
i=1 xi
1
si
subject to
∑i
j=1 xj ≤ si − 1, i = 1, . . . , k.
The optimal solution of this maximization problem is x1 = s1 − 1, xi = si −
si−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Hence p(L) ≤ (s1−1) 1s1 + (s2−s1) 1s2 + · · ·+ (sk−sk−1) 1sk ≤
1
2 + · · ·+ 1sk ≤ lnn. Summarizing, we obtain p(L)/p(W ) ≤
√
n lnn. uunionsq
In [12] it is conjectured that α = O(
√
n) holds for complete simple games. In
the same paper a lower bound of order
√
n is given, as well as specific subclasses
of complete simple games for which α = O(
√
n) can be proven.
5 Algorithmic Aspects
A fundamental question concerns the complexity of our original problem (1). For
general simple games this depends on how the game in question is given, and we
refer to Section 1 for a discussion. Here we concentrate on the graphic” case.
Proposition 3. Computing αG for bipartite graphs G can be done in polynomial
time.
Proof. Let P ⊆ Rn Be the set of feasible payoffs (satisfying p ≥ 0 and pi+pj ≥ 1
for ij ∈ E). For α ∈ R, let Pα := {p ∈ P | p(L) ≤ α for all independent L ⊆ N}.
Thus αG = min{α | Pα 6= ∅}. The separation problem for Pα (for any given
α) is efficiently solvable. Given p ∈ Rn, we can check feasibility and whether
max{p(L) | L ⊆ N independent} ≤ α by solving a corresponding maximum
weight independent set problem in the bipartite graph G. Thus we can, for any
given α ∈ R, apply the ellipsoid method to either compute some p ∈ Pα or
conclude that Pα = ∅. Binary search then exhibits the minimum value for which
Pα is non-empty; binary search works indeed in polynomial time as the optimal
α has size polynomially bounded in n, which follows from observing that
α = min{a | pi+pj ≥ 1 ∀ij ∈ E, p(L)−a ≤ 0 ∀L ⊆ N independent, p ≥ 0} (3)
can be computed by solving a linear system of n constraints defining an optimal
basic solution of the above linear program. uunionsq
The proof of Proposition 3 also applies to other classes of graphs, such as
claw-free graphs (see [6]) in which finding a weighted maximum independent set
is polynomial-time solvable. In general, the problem is NP-hard.
Proposition 4. Computing αG for arbitrary graphs G is NP-hard.
Proof. Let G′ = (N ′, E′) and G′′ = (N ′′, E′′) be two disjoint copies of a graph
G = (N,E) with independence number k. For each i′ ∈ N ′ and j′′ ∈ N ′′ add an
edge i′j′′ if and only if i = j or ij ∈ E and call the resulting graphG∗ = (N∗, E∗).
We claim that αG∗ = k/2 (thus computing αG∗ is as difficult as computing k).
First note that the independent sets in G∗ are exactly the sets L∗ ⊆ N∗
that arise from an independent set L ⊆ N in G by splitting L into two com-
plementary sets L1 and L2 and defining L∗ := L′1 ∪ L′′2 . Hence, p ≡ 12 on N∗
yields max p(L∗) = k/2 where the maximum is taken over all independent sets
L∗ ⊆ N∗ in G∗. This shows that αG∗ ≤ k/2.
Conversely, let p∗ be any feasible payoff in G∗, that is, p∗ ≥ 0 and p∗i +p∗j ≥ 1
for all ij ∈ E∗. Let L ⊆ N be a maximum independent set of size k in G and
construct L∗ by including for each i ∈ L either i′ or i′′ in L∗, whichever has
p-value at least 12 . Then, by construction, L
∗ is an independent set in G∗ with
p∗(L∗) ≥ k/2, showing that αG∗ ≥ k/2. uunionsq
Summarizing, for graphic simple games, computing αG is as least as hard
as computing the size of a maximum independent in G. For our last result we
assume that a is a fixed integer, that is, a is not part of the input.
Proposition 5. For every fixed a > 0, it is possible to decide if αG ≤ a in
polynomial time for an arbitrary graph G = (N,E).
Proof. Let k = 2da+ e for some  > 0. By brute-force, we can check in O(n2k)
time if N contains 2k vertices {u1, . . . , uk} ∪ {v1, . . . , vk} that induce k disjoint
copies of P2, that is, paths Pi = uivi of length 2 for i = 1, . . . , k with no
edges joining any two of these paths. If so, then the condition p(ui) + p(vi) ≥ 1
implies that one of ui, vi, say ui, must receive a payoff p(ui) ≥ 12 , and hence
U = {u1, . . . , uk} has p(U) ≥ k/2 > a. As U is an independent set, α(G) > a.
Now assume that G does not contain k disjoint copies of P2 as an induced
subgraph, that is, G is kP2-free. For every s ≥ 1, the number of maximal inde-
pendent sets in a sP2-free graphs is nO(s) due to a result of Balas and Yu [2].
Tsukiyama, Ide, Ariyoshi, and Shirakawa [30] show how to enumerate all maxi-
mal independent sets of a graph G on n vertices and m edges using time O(nm)
per independent set. Hence we can find all maximal independent sets of G and
thus solve, in polynomial time, the linear program (3). Then it remains to check
if the solution found satisfies α ≤ a. uunionsq
6 Conclusions
After our paper appeared, Kanstantsin Pashkovich [1] found a proof of Conjec-
ture 1. Hence it remains to tighten the upper bound for complete simple games
to O(
√
n). In order to classify simple games, many more subclasses of simple
games have been identified in the literature. Besides the two open problems,
no optimal bounds for α are known for other subclasses of simple games, such
as strong, proper, or constant-sum games, that is, where v(S) + v(N\S) ≥ 1,
v(S) + v(N\S) ≤ 1, or v(S) + v(N\S) = 1 for all S ⊆ N , respectively.
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